THE RISE OF WAHHABISM AND ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH TALIBANISATION IN THE SWAT REGION OF KHYBER PUKHTUNKHWA, PAKISTAN (2007-2009)
Keywords:
Wahhabism, Talibanisation, Sufism, Barelvi, democracy, Swat Valley, shariʻt; tariqatAbstract
This study explores the rise of Wahhabism—an Arabian-based socio-religious reform movement emphasizing Islamic monotheism—and its ideological and operational intersections with Talibanisation in the Swat Valley of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan, from 2007 to 2009. Wahhabism's assimilation with Al-Qaeda's transnational agenda provided ideological impetus to the Taliban’s efforts in Swat, particularly their campaign for the implementation of Shariah law. This paper critically examines the Taliban's explicit objectives, which included dismantling the region's socio-cultural norms shaped by entrenched Sufi traditions, as well as their broader ideological ambitions. The analysis draws on data from printed and electronic media, Taliban communications, and personal observations, supplemented by eyewitness accounts. The findings suggest that, while the Taliban ostensibly sought to replace the existing judicial system with Shariah law, their insurgency also aimed to suppress women’s rights, challenge Sufi practices, and oppose Western democratic values. These efforts are interpreted as a confluence of ideological commitment and a strategic endeavor to align with Pakistan's geo-political objectives in the region.
References
TNSM was a religious movement started in Lower Dir, Timargarah, in June 1989, under the headship of Sufi Muhammad, for the explicit purpose of replacing the incumbent legal regime with shariʻh laws in the courts of Malakand division. The Swat Valley soon turned out to be its epicentre wherein the movement kept continued its struggle throughout 1990s and compelled the state of Pakistan to capitulate in favour of their demands but avoided to implement it in letter and spirit. The unfulfilled mission of TNSM was restarted by Maulana Fazlullah (the son-in-law of Sufi Muhammad) in late 2004, and after three years struggle took larger segments of the society into confidence and virtually controlled the area and implemented their so-called shariʻh laws on the people, for details see Gohar Ali, “Talibanisation in Swat: Causes and Effects” (PhD dissertation, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, 2022), 40-150.
Those who are labelled with the word ‘Wahhabi’ do not themselves use this term, as it is used as a means of belittlement. They preferred themselves to be called ‘mua’hidun’ or ‘tauhidi’, see Haneef James Oliver, The Wahhabi Myth: Dispelling the prevalent Fallacies and the Fictitious Link with Bin Laden (2002, n.p.), 7.
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Ibid.
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For detailed evolvement of the Pakistani militant groups, their patrons, target areas of operations and their Wahhabite tendencies, see Burke, Al-Qaeda, 91-92; Amir Mir, Talibanisation of Pakistan: From 9/11 to 26/11, with Foreword by Khaled Ahmad (New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2009), 54-73, 169-179, 298-206.
The link of JITS/Panjpir Madrasah with Saudi Arabia and its role in spreading the orthodox tenets of Islam, in the Pukhtun’s areas and more specifically in the strategically important Pak-Afghan border area of Nuristan, Kunar and Malakand division see, Rahmaullah, The Taliban in Bajaur, in Peter Burgen, Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics, and Religion (Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2015), 317; for some detail about the ideological link between TNSM and other Kashmir and sectarian based jihadi organizations and the role played by Abdul Rab Sayyaf, Sheikh Jamil al-Rahman and Mulvi Muhammad Afzal, see Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy (trans.) Islamist Networks The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2004), 38, 48; also see Haroon, Frontier of Faith, 193, 198-199; Max Klimburg, “The situation in Nuristan,” Central Asian Survey, 20, no.3 (2001): 383-390; David B. Edwards, Before Taliban :Genealogies of the Afghan Jihad (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 172, 176, 263, 294, 360; Abubakar Siddique, The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Pakistan and Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Co., 2014), 79-81, 95, 116; Frank A. Clements, Conflict in Afghanistan : A Historical Encyclopedia (London: ABC CLIVE. 2003), 59, 173; Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2003), 66-67, 75.
For detailed study of Al-Qaeda’s integration into the Pukhtuns society of FATA and settled areas of KP and the way their ideas, norms and practices get localised in order to survive and sustain, see Rohan Gunaratna & Anders Nielsen “Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31, no. 9 (2008): 775-807, DOI: 10.1080/10576100802291568: https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100802291568 Accessed: 10/05/17 10:20.
For details that how Durand Line became an ideological frontier during Cold War; how the tribal structure transformed in terms of leadership role in the last decade of the twentieth century; and how since September 11, Islam has been presented in internal – amalgamation of tribalism and religiosity–and external–radicalised Islam that is struggling against modernism, state power and the entire Western world, see Schetter, Conrad, “The Durand Line: The Afghan-Pakistani Border Region between Pashtunistan, Tribalistan and Taliban,”Internationales Asien Forum. International Quarterly for Asian Studies 44, no. 1/2 (May 2013): 61-63; also See, Syed Farooq Hasnat,“Pakistan’s Strategic Interests, Afghanistan and the Fluctuating U,”Journal of International Affairs (Fall 2009): 163.
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Mir, Talibanisation of Pakistan, 390-391.
Fazlullah FM Speech/Sermon, Sersinai, June, 2006.
Fazlullah Speech/Sermon, Bismillah Mosque, Kozah Bandai, Swat, January, 2006.
For details that how the Lal Masjid seize since July 3, 2007 in Pakistan became a cause of a standoff between the Pakistani security forces and radical Islamic elements within Pakistan and for what purpose Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri urged Pakistanis to avenge the sacrifice of the “martyrs” in the cause of Islam, and how the Swat valley became a bloody battleground between Fazlullah-group and security forces, see Rohan Gunaratna & Anders Nielsen, “Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 9 (December 2008): 778, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100802291568. (accessed December 24, 2017); also see Adam Dolnik and Khuram Iqbal, Negotiaing the Siege of the Lal Masjid (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2016), 241-45; also see Adeel Khan, “Pakistan in 2007: More Violent, More Unstable,” Asian Survey 48, no. 1 (January/February2008): 144-153, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2008.48.1.144. (accessed January 9, 2018).
On FM radio, Fazlullah sketched the prospective plan for iqamat-e-din period as: That Swat will become a model for the whole country like Madina used to be in the time of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH); adultery, murder, robbery, and photography will end; shaving or trimming of beards will be the storey of bygone; and coming of women out of homes without veils (burqʻh) will be a rare phenomena, see Fazlullah FM Speech/Sermon, Mamdherai Markaz, October, 2006.
Sajjad Malik, “Media and Militancy: Case Study of Use of FM Radio by Taliban in Swat,” IPRI, XIII, no. 1 (2013): 80.
Shabana, a local female dancer, was allegedly beheaded by the Taliban in the city of Mingawara, in December 2008. Her body was then dragged on the streets and laid in the ‘Green Chawak’, for betoken.
Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), December 07, 2008.
For details about the nature of crimes and the way the criminals would be flogged in public spaces, see Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), 19 November, 2008; 13 December, 2008; 16 December, 2008; 27 April, 2009.
Taliban’s leader would warned men of shaving beard and uncovered head, see, Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), 16 December 2008.
Gunaratna & Nielsen, “Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond,” 777, 775-807.
Sultan-i-Rome, “Indigenous People of the Swat Valley.” Brill’s Encyclopaedia of the Religions of the Indigenous People of South Asia, edited by Muzaffar Alam, Vol. 36, BRILL, 2021, 894.
For some details about women’s role in the early conquests of Islam, see Katharina Von Knop, "The female jihad: Al Qaeda's women," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 5 (2007): 406-407.
Personal communications with female relatives, Hazara, Swat.
Hazrat Ali, interview by researcher, Ningwalai, Swat, December 24, 2011.
Personal communications with female relatives, tahsil Kabal, Swat.
For details see DVD film/video, Swat I, II and III, n.p., n.d.
Farhat Haq, “Militarism and Motherhood: The Women of the Lashkar‐i‐Tayyabia in Pakistan,” Signs 32, no. 4 (Summer 2007): 1037, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/512729. Accessed: 18/06/2014.
The living of women inside the four walls and wearing of burqa is not an alien culture in Pukhtun’s society. However, since the Taliban rule in Afghanistan the purdah albeit Shariah based, got impetus in some section of the Swati society. In the early reformative drive of Taliban this culture has been exalted so much so that in some cases it led to separation of families living jointly.
According to anecdotal evidence, in late 2008, in the villages of Seir and Taligram females were warned on loudspeaker to be remained inside the houses and dateline for wearing burqʻh was also fixed, Personal communications with a high school’s teacher, GHSS, Kishawra, Swat, September 12, 2012.
Anita M. Weiss, “Crisis and Reconciliation in Swat Through the Eyes of Women”, in Beyond Swat History, Society and Economy along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, eds. Bejamin D. Hopkins and Magnus Marsden (London: C. Hurst and Co., 2013), 184.
Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), December 23, 2008.
Roznama Aaj Peshawar (Urdu daily: Peshawar), April 23, 2009.
Sultan-i-Rome, Brill’s Encyclopaedia of the Religions of the Indigenous People of South Asia, Boston: Brill, 2021. 886-887.
Rafiullah Khan, “Sacrality Continues: Socio-Religious Syncretism in Swat and its Manifestation in Oral and Visual Traditions,” South Asian Studies, 32, no. 2 (2016): 166-179.
Wick, “Saints of the Indus,” 9.
McMahon & Ramsay, Report on the Tribes of the Malakand Political Agency, 16.
Holy shrines that were believed to be endowed with divinity and were specified for particular diseases, materialisation of rare objects and foodstuff and providing fertility to barrens, were of trans-regional importance in the Pukhtuns belt.
Sultan-i-Rome, “Indigenous People of the Swat Valley,” 895.
Islah-i-Eyman (Karachi: Masjid Ibrahim, 1990); Islah-i-Eyman (Multan: Masjid Tauhid, 2003); Barkat ul Allah, Bidʻat al-Marg (Gujranwala: 2001); Tajala Khan, Jadu ke Sharʻi Hithyat (Multan: n.d.).
For details about the warning letters of Taliban’s leadership to amulets makers and such like other practitioners; and the grievous conditions of these professionals by forcefully repenting and quitting from these practices, see Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), December 14, 2008; January 4, 2009; February 15, 2009.
Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), December 2, 2008.
The electronic devices for instance TV, VCR, DVD, audio and video cassettes, photographs and all other stuffs resembling living creatures, would be collected in large quantity and then after Jumʻh prayer would be confiscated publicly. At night after sermon, these activities would be announced on FM radio, under separate heading, called ‘khushkhbriaṇ’, see Fazlullah’s FM Radio Sermons/Speeches (personal collection).
The Taliban devotion to ‘Tauhid’ and distaste for ‘shirk’ was a well-known fact. Some anecdotal evidences suggest their fanaticism that they even did not spare stones for being appeared to be human in shape. As far as the destruction of much aired Budah statues of Jan Abad and Ghaligḗ areas are pertaining to, the Taliban reportedly neither took responsibility nor substantiated by eye-witness account. However, the incident took place just before the start of the military operation against the Taliban, despite foreseeable warning of the curator of the Swat Museum, sees BBC Urdu.com, September 29, 2007; also see Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), October 2, 2007.
Rahimullah Yusafzai, “Inside Fazlullah’s headquarters,” http://valleyswat.net, retrieved: November 6, 2007.
Fazli Rabi Rahi, Awar Swat Jalta Raha (Urdu) (Mingawara: Shoaib Sons Publishers, 2011), 34.
As was personally observed, majority of the adherents of Barailvi sect who are also known as Ahl-i-Sunnat wal-Jamaʻt either went into the background or migrated to other parts of the country for security reasons.
Maulana Abdul Mustafa Chishti, Shuhad’-i-Swat (Lahore: Tahrik Tahafuz-i-Islam Pakistan, n.d.), 6.
Mir, Talibanisation of Pakistan, 384.
Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), December 17, 2008.
Shaheen Buneri, “Swat Valley- The Metamorphosis,” Tribal Analysis Center (September 2012): 8.
Personal Communications with Secondary School Teacher, Pir Baba, Bunir, October 6, 2017.
Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), April 12, 2009; April 19, 2009.
The Express Tribune, July 26, 2010, https://tribune.com.pk/story/23782/revisiting-rahman-babas-shrine/, retrieved: November 15, 2014.
In the third week of April 2009, the Government of Punjab convened a council of ulama, comprising largely of Barailvi sect, who unanimously issued fatwa in which suicide attacks, as per Islamic injunctions, were declared unlawful. On June 12, 2009, Sarfaraz Naeemi, a leading anti-Taliban Barailvi cleric was allegedly killed by suicide bomber in Lahore at his seminary’s office after Friday prayer, see “Suicide bomber kills anti-Taliban cleric Allama Naeemi,” Daily Dawn, June 13, 2009.
For detailed assessment of Pakistan counterterrorism approach against TTP, see Muhammad Feyyaz, “Why Pakistan Does not Have a Counterterrorism Narrative,” Journal of Strategic Security, 8, no. 1-2 (Spring/Summer 2015): 63-78, http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol8/iss1/5, retrieved: June 5, 2018.
Anonymous, ‘Pakistani citizens post anti-Taleban letters to top officials’ BBC Monitoring South Asia ; London [London]29 Apr 2009 (accessed: 14 January 2018).
Anonymous, ‘Swat Taliban, banned group warn Pakistan MPs against opposing peace deal’. BBC Monitoring South Asia, London [London] April 13, 2009, retrieved: January 9, 2018.
Imtiaz Ali, “Militant or Peace Broker? A Profile of the Swat Valley’s Maulana Sufi Muhammad,” Terrorism Monitor, VIII, no. 7 (March, 2009): 7.
Ghulam Dastageer, “Sufi Speaks out against TTP,” Daily Dawn, May 2, 2015.
BBC Monitoring South Asia, London [London] August 3, 2009.
Ovamir Anjum, “Salafis and Democracy: Doctrine and Context,” The Muslim World, 106 (July 2016): 14.
For detailed uncritical stance of TNSM leadership about democracy and Shariah Laws, see Sufi Muhammad, Wajuhat-e-Arbaa Ashrah li Marifat-e-Haqiqat-e al-Shariat-e al-Muhammadiah; Yani Swaarlas Wajuhaat da Pijandalu da Shariat-e-Muhammadi (Pashto) (Amandara, Batkhela: Markaz Muqam Tanzim Tahrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi, 2008), 52-66, 110-112, 157-158; Sayyad Ali Shah, Da Shariat Karwan: Manzal bah Manzal (Pashto) (Lahore: Mukhtar Ahmad Khan Swati (Idara Nashr al-Maarif), 1995), 58-61, 65-72, 80-86;
Sultan-i-Rome, “Tahrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi and Democracy,” 16-17.
For detailed report about the number of politicians and other notables of Swat for being formally summoned in the court of the Taliban, see Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), January 26, 2009.
For detailed contempt of Sufi Muhammad and other TNSM activists, against Western democracy, electoral politics and political parties, see Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), October 12, 2008; October 15, 2008; October 22, 2008; October 25, 2008; October 29, 2008;
Personal Communications with teachers and students of GHSS, Dherai, 2015-18.
Interview with ex-chairman zakath committee, Kanju, Swat, January 10, 2015.
Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), August 15, 2008.
Two naib nazims namely: Zakir Khan and Liaqat Ali, of tahsil Matta, were reportedly killed see Roznama Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), November 26, 2008.
Personal Communications with ex union council nazim, Kabal, Swat, August 12, 2019.
Maqbul Arshad, Maiṇ Khud Kash Hamlah Awar Kisi Bana? (Urdu)(Lahore: Tahir Sons Publishers, 2010), 104-105.
For details of the wanted list of the peoples, their political and social background, how many of them were killed and what services they offered to security forces and what position they are holding in the current political and social setup of district Swat, see Arshad, Maiṇ Khud Kash Hamlah Awar Kisi Bana?, 105.
The recognized number of growing IDPs has turned into a confusing number. Following is the available number: NADRA 1.73 m; SSG 2 m approx; UNHCR/ ERU 2.9 m; UN Secretary General 2.4 m; HRCP 1.783 m. See Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Weekly Updates, June 8, 2009.
For contradictory statements of Inter Service Public Relations (ISPR) and Interior Ministry regarding Fazlullah’s injury, encirclement, arrest and escape, see Roznama, Azadi Swat (Urdu daily: Mingawara, Swat), June 9, 2009; June 11 2009; June 22, 2009; June 23 2009; June 24, 2009; June 27, 2009; July 2, 2009; July 3, 2009; July 10, 2009; for some details that how despite the avowed Rah-i-Rast operation Fazlullah successfully escaped into Afghanistan and the consequent suicide or guerrilla attacks against the political elites, dented the entire efforts of the military, see Arshad, Maiṇ Khud Kash Hamlah Awar Kisi Bana? 106.
David Gartenstein, “A Temporary Marriage of Convenience: Transnational Jihadists in Proxy Warfare,” Fletcher Sec. Rev., 41 (2014): 50.
After the arrest of Sufi Muhammad, the provincial government restored thirteen cases against him that were pending since 1994 and referred them to Anti- Terrorism Courts (ATC). In most cases he was accused of sedition, hatching a conspiracy against the state and hurling threats, see Daily Dawn, December 15, 2015; in late 2014, he was reportedly acquitted in ten cases due to lack of evidence under Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 265-K), and referred the remaining three cases to regular courts for being out of scheduled ATC jurisdiction, see Waseem Ahmad Shah, Daily Dawn, November 23, 2014.
For details about Sufi’s arrest, trials and the legal lacuna and complication which leads to their acquittal see Daily Dawn, (internet edition), November 22, 2011; November 23, 2014: December 15, 2015; April 23, 2015.
In early August 2022, the Taliban unexpectedly reappeared in Swat which resultantly created fresh wave of unrest among Swatis. Surprisingly, the overwhelming backlash of the local peoples throughout the width and breadth of the Swat Valley did not succeed them to prevail over again, see Fazal Khaliq, “Fresh Wave of Unrest: Swatis Reject Terrorism,” LEEKWAL, November, 2022, 49-51.
In October 2017, the JITS, after hibernation of eight years, arranged a gathering of devotees, from all over the country, in the Grassy Ground, Mingawara, Swat, in which Maulana Muhmmad Tayyab Tahiri, the current Amir of the seminary, along with some other stalwarts participated. Though, the attempt could not succeed to attract the anticipated quantity of followers, as it has been personally observed, but the zest of the ideologues for the rhetorical shariʻh laws in the region and disgust against the Barailvi sect, were awe-inspiring. During speech one of the leaders expressed his hatred in Pukhtu poetical style, meaning that: As the eagle attacks on pigeons in the same passion Panjpiris take down the Barailvis
